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Abstract
Quantum information is well known to achieve cryptographic feats that are unattainable using
classical information alone. Here, we add to this repertoire by introducing a new cryptographic
functionality called uncloneable encryption. This functionality allows the encryption of a classical
message such that two collaborating but isolated adversaries are prevented from simultaneously
recovering the message, even when the encryption key is revealed. Clearly, such functionality is
unattainable using classical information alone.
We formally define uncloneable encryption, and show how to achieve it using Wiesner’s conjugate
coding, combined with a quantum-secure pseudorandom function (qPRF). Modelling the qPRF as
an oracle, we show security by adapting techniques from the quantum one-way-to-hiding lemma, as
well as using bounds from quantum monogamy-of-entanglement games.
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1 Introduction
A key distinction between classical and quantum information is given by the no-cloning
principle: unlike bits, arbitrary qubits cannot be perfectly copied [11, 18, 26]. This principle
is the basis of many of the feats of quantum cryptography, including quantum money [25]
and quantum key distribution (QKD) [6] (for a survey on quantum cryptography, see [9]).
In QKD, two parties establish a shared secret key, using public quantum communication
combined with an authentic classical channel. The quantum communication allows to detect
eavesdropping: when the parties detect only a small amount of eavesdropping, they can
produce a shared string that is essentially guaranteed to be private. Gottesman [15] studied
quantum tamper-detection in the case of encryption schemes: in this work, a classical message
is encrypted into a quantum ciphertext such that, at decryption time, the receiver will detect
if an adversary could have information about the plaintext when the key is revealed. We
note that classical information alone cannot produce such encryption schemes, since it is
always possible to perfectly copy ciphertexts.
Notably, Gottesman left open the question of an encryption scheme that would prevent
the splitting of a ciphertext. In other words, would it be possible to encrypt a classical
message into a quantum ciphertext, such that no attack at the ciphertext level would be
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significantly successful in producing two quantum registers, each of which, when combined
with the decryption key, could be used to reconstruct the plaintext?
In this work, we define, construct and prove security for a scheme that answers Gottesman’s
question in the positive. We call this uncloneable encryption. The core technical aspects of
this work were first presented in one of the author’s M.Sc. thesis [16].
1.1 Summary of Contributions
We consider encryption schemes that encode classical plaintexts into quantum ciphertexts,
which we formalize in Definition 4. For simplicity, in this work, we consider only the one-time,
symmetric-key case. Next, we define uncloneable encryption (Definition 8). Informally, this
can be thought of as a game, played between the honest sender (Alice) and two malicious
recipients (Bob and Charlie). First, Alice picks a messagem ∈ {0, 1}n and a key k ∈ {0, 1}κ(λ)
(κ is a polynomial in some security parameter, λ). She encrypts her message into a quantum
ciphertext register R. Initially, Bob and Charlie are physically together, and they receive R.
They apply a quantum map to produce two registers: Bob keeps register B and Charlie
keeps register C. Bob and Charlie are then isolated. In the next phase, Alice reveals k to
both parties. Using k and their quantum register, Bob and Charlie produce mB and mC
respectively. Bob and Charlie win if and only if mB = mC = m. The scheme is t-uncloneable
secure if their winning probability is upper bounded by 2−n+t + η(λ) for a negligible η.
Assuming that Alice picks her message uniformly at random, our results are summarized in
Figure 1, where we plot upper bounds for the winning probability of Bob and Charlie against
various types of encodings, according to the length ofm. First of all, if the encoding is classical,
then Bob and Charlie can each keep a copy of the ciphertext. Combined with the key k, each
party decrypts to obtain m. This gives the horizontal line at Pr[Adversaries win] = 1. Next,
a lower bound on the winning probability for any encryption scheme is 12n (corresponding to
the parties coordinating a random guess). This is the ideal curve. Our goal is therefore to
produce an encryption scheme that matches the ideal curve as close as possible.
It may seem that asking that Alice sample her message uniformly at random would be
particularly restrictive, but this is not the case – we show in Theorem 9 that security in the
case of uniformly sampled messages implies security in the case of non-uniformly sampled
messages, if the message size does not grow with the security parameter. Specifically, if Bob
and Charlie can win with probability at most 2−n+t + η(λ) when the message is sampled
uniformly at random, for some t and some negligible function η, then they can win with
probability at most 2−h+t + η′(λ) if the message m is sampled from a distribution with a
min-entropy of h where η′ is a negligible function which is larger than η.
Our first attempt at realizing uncloneable encryption (Appendix A) shows that the
well-known Wiesner conjugate coding [25] already achieves a security bound that is better
than any classical scheme. For any two bit strings x, θ ∈ {0, 1}n, define the Wiesner state∣∣xθ〉 = Hθ1 |x1〉⊗ . . .⊗Hθn |xn〉. The encryption uses a random key r, θ ∈ {0, 1}n and maps a
classical message m into the quantum state ρ =
∣∣(m⊕ r)θ〉〈(m⊕ r)θ∣∣; given (r, θ), decryption
consists in measuring in the basis determined by θ to obtain x and then computing x⊕ r. We
sketch a proof that this satisfies a notion of security for encryption schemes. The question
of uncloneability then boils down to: “How well can an adversary split ρ into two registers,
each of which, combined with (θ, r) can reconstruct m?” This question is answered in prior
work on monogamy-of-entanglement games [20]: an optimal strategy wins with probability(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)n
. This is again illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 Upper-bounds on winning probabilities for various types of encodings (up to negligible
functions of λ) for messages sampled uniformly at random.
In order to improve this bound, we use a quantum-secure pseudorandom function (qPRF,
see Definition 3) fλ : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}n. The encryption (see Section 4.1) consists
of a quantum state ρ =
∣∣rθ〉〈rθ∣∣ for random r, θ ∈ {0, 1}λ, together with a classical string
c = m⊕ fλ(s, r) for a random s. The key k consists in θ and s. Once again, it can be shown
that this is an encryption scheme in a more usual sense and we sketch this argument in
Section 4.1. Intuitively, the use of fλ affords us a gain in uncloneable security, because an
adversary who wants to output m would need to know the pre-image of m under fλ(s, ·).
Reaching a formal proof along these lines, however, is tricky. First, we model the qPRF using
a quantum random oracle [8]; this limits the adversaries’ interaction with the qPRF to be
black-box quantum queries (we refer to Section 4.3 for further details on this modelling). Next,
the quantum random oracle model is notoriously tricky to use and many of the techniques in
the classical literature are not directly applicable. Fortunately, we can adapt techniques from
Unruh’s quantum one-way-to-hiding lemma [22] to the two-player setting, which enables us
to recover a precise statement along the lines of the intuition above. We thus complete the
proof of our main Theorem 16, obtaining the bound 9 · 12n + negl(λ). This is the fourth and
final curve in Figure 1.
In addition to the above, we formally define a different type of uncloneable security:
inspired by more standard security definitions of indistinguishability, we define uncloneable-
indistinguishability (Definition 11). This security definition bounds the advantage that
the adversaries have at simultaneously distinguishing between an encryption of 0n and an
encryption of a plaintext of length n, as prepared by the adversaries. In a series of results
(Theorems 12 and 17 and Corollary 18), we show that our main protocol achieves this security
notion against adversaries that use unentangled strategies and as long as the message size
does not grow with λ. As discussed in Section 1.2, there are interesting uses cases where we
can assume that the adversaries do not share entanglement.
We note that our protocols (both Definition 19 and Definition 13) have the desirable
property of being prepare-and-measure schemes. This means that the quantum technology for
the honest users is limited to the preparation of single-qubit pure states, as well as to single-
qubit measurements; these quantum technologies are mature and commercially available.
(Note, however, that quantum storage remains a major challenge at the implementation
level).
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1.2 Applications
While our focus is on the conceptual contribution of defining and proving a new primitive,
we believe that uncloneable encryption could have many applications. We give two such
examples.
1.2.1 Quantum Money
As it captures the idea of “uncloneable classical information” in a very generic manner,
uncloneable encryption can be used as a tool to build other primitives which leverage the
uncloneability of quantum states. Such constructions help us understand the landscape of
quantum cryptography. As an example, any uncloneable secure encryption scheme naturally
yields a private-key quantum money scheme [2, 25].
To obtain quantum money from an uncloneable encryption scheme, we identify the
notion of “simultaneously passing the bank’s verification” with the notion of “simultaneously
obtaining the correct plaintext”. To generate a banknote, the bank samples a message m,
a key k, a serial number s and produces as output (s, Enc(k,m)), where Enc(k,m) is the
uncloneable encryption of m with the key k. When the bank is asked to verify a banknote, it
verifies the serial number in its database to retrieve k, decrypts the ciphertext and verifies if
the message obtained is indeed m.
The uncloneable security guarantee implies that the probability of a malicious party
producing two banknotes which pass this test is negligible. If this were not the case, we
could use the attack which counterfeits the banknote to essentially copy the ciphertext in
the underlying uncloneable encryption scheme. The adversaries tasked with obtaining the
message once the key is revealed then simply decrypt as if they were the honest receivers.
1.2.2 Preventing Storage Attacks by Classical Adversaries
Indistinguishable-uncloneable encryption prevents a single eavesdropping adversary with no
quantum memory from collecting ciphertexts exchanged by two honest parties in the hope of
later learning the key. We sketch an argument for this fact.
Suppose such an adversary obtains a ciphertext from an uncloneable-indistinguishable
encryption scheme. We claim that they cannot correctly determine if the ciphertext corres-
ponds to the encryption of 0n or of some known message m with non-negligible advantage,
even if the decryption key becomes known after their measurement of the ciphertext. If such
an adversary existed, it could be used to break the uncloneable-indistinguishable security of
the encryption scheme. Indeed, the almost-classical eavesdropper could create two copies of
their classical memory and distribute it to the two adversaries who attempt to obtain the
message once the key is revealed.1
Note that the adversaries in this attack do not share any entanglement and so we can
apply Corollary 18 which states that our encryption scheme is uncloneable-indistinguishable
secure under this condition.
Our work is currently in the private-key setting, but can be extended in a straightforward
way to the public-key setting. In this scenario, we can still guarantee the secrecy of the
message even if the eavesdropper is later able to determine the decryption key from the
publicly-known encryption key. In other words, an eavesdropping adversary with no quantum
memory would need to attack the ciphertext during transmission. This is known as long-term
security or everlasting security [21].
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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1.3 More on Related Work
Starting with the foundational work of Wiesner [25], a rich body of literature has considered
the encoding of classical information into quantum states in order to take advantage of
quantum properties for cryptography.
Quantum Key Recycling. The concept of quantum key recycling is a precursor to the
QKD protocol, developed by Bennett, Brassard, and Breidbart [7] (the manuscript was
prepared in 1982 but only published recently). According to this protocol, it is possible to
encrypt a classical message into a quantum state, such that information-theoretic security
is assured, but in addition, a tamper detection mechanism would allow the one-time pad
key to be re-used in the case that no eavesdropping is detected. Quantum key recycling
has been the object of recent related work [10, 13].
Tamper-Evident Encryption. We referred above to tamper-detection in the case of
encryption, which we will also call tamper-evident encryption. However, we emphasize
that the author originally called this contribution uncloneable encryption [15]. We justify
this choice of re-labelling in quoting the conclusion of the work:
One difficulty with such generalizations is that it is unclear to what extent the
name “uncloneable encryption” is really deserved. I have not shown that a message
protected by uncloneable encryption cannot be copied – only that Eve cannot copy
it without being detected. Is it possible for Eve to create two states, (...), which
can each be used (in conjunction with the secret key) to extract a good deal of
information about the message? Or can one instead prove bounds, for instance, on
the sum of the information content of the various purported copies? [15]
Since our work addresses this question, we have appropriately re-labeled prior work
according to a seemingly more accurate name. To the best of our knowledge, the precise
relationship between quantum key-recycling, tamper-evident encryption, and uncloneable
encryption is unknown (see Section 1.4).
Quantum Copy-Protection. Further related work includes the study of quantum
copy-protection, as initiated by Aaronson [1]. Informally, this is a means to encode a
function (from a given family of functions) into a quantum program state, such that an
honest party can evaluate the function given the program state, but it would be impossible
to somehow split the quantum program state so as to enable two parties to simultaneously
evaluate the function. Aaronson gave protocols for quantum copy-protection in an oracle
model, but left wide open the question of quantum copy-protection in the plain model.
In a way, uncloneable encryption is a first step towards quantum copy-protection, since it
prevents copying of data, which can be seen as a unit of information that is even simpler
than a function.
1.4 Outlook and Future Work
In this work, we challenge one of the tacit assumptions of encryptions, namely that adversaries
can always copy ciphertexts. We believe that this has the potential to significantly change
the landscape of cryptography, for instance in terms of techniques for key management [5].
Furthermore, our techniques could become building blocks for a theory of uncloneable
cryptography.
Our work leads to many follow-up questions, broadly classified according to the following
themes:
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Improvements. There are many possible improvements to the current work. For
instance: Could our scheme be made resilient to errors? Can we remove the reliance
on the oracle, and/or on the qPRF? Could an encryption scheme simultaneously be
uncloneable and provide tamper detection? Would achieving uncloneable-indistinguishable
security be possible, without any restrictions on the adversary’s strategy?
Links with related work. What are the links, if any, between uncloneable encryption,
tamper-evident encryption [15], and quantum encryption with key recycling [7, 10, 13]?
We note that both uncloneable encryption and quantum encryption with key recycling [13]
make use of theorems developed in the context of one-sided device-independent QKD [20].
Can we make more formal links between these primitives?
More uncloneability. Finally, our work paves the way for the study of more complex
unclonable primitives. Could this lead to uncloneable programs [1]? What about in
complexity theory, could we define and realize uncloneable proofs [1]?
1.5 Outline
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some basic
notation and useful results from the literature. In Section 3, we formally define uncloneable
encryption schemes and their security. Our main scheme is described in Section 4 (with a
toy scheme based on Wiesner conjugate coding being described in Appendix A). Due to lack
of space, most proofs are relegated to Appendix B and the remainder can be found in the
full version.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present our notation and techniques from prior works used in this paper.
2.1 Notation and Basics of Quantum Information
We denote the set of all functions of the form f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m by Bool(n,m). We
denote the set of strictly positive natural numbers by N+. All Hilbert spaces are finite
dimensional. We overload the expectation symbol E in the following way: If X is a finite
set, X a random variable on X, and f : X → R some function, we define Ex←X f(x) to be∑
x∈X Pr [X = x] f(x). If we omit the random variable then we assume a uniform distribution,
i.e.: Ex f(x) = 1|X|
∑
x∈X f(x). If X is a random variable distributed over a finite set X,
then its min-entropy is given by −maxx∈X Pr [X = x]. A function η : N→ R is said to be
negligible if for all n ∈ N there exists an xn > 0 such that x > xn implies that |η(x)| < x−n.
A comprehensive introduction to quantum information and quantum computing may be
found in [17, 24]. We fix some notation in the following paragraphs.
Let Q = C2 be the state space of a single qubit. In particular, Q is a two-dimensional
complex Hilbert space spanned by the orthonormal set {|0〉 , |1〉}. For any n ∈ N+, we write
Q(n) = Q⊗n and note that {|s〉 = |s1〉⊗ |s2〉⊗ . . .⊗|sn〉}s∈{0,1}n forms an orthonormal basis
of Q(n).
Let H be a Hilbert space. The set of all unitary and density operators on H are denoted,
respectively, by U(H) and D(H). We recall that the operator norm of a linear operator
A : H → H′ between finite dimensional Hilbert spaces is given by ‖A‖ = maxv∈H,‖v‖=1 ‖Av‖
and satisfies the property that ‖Av‖ ≤ ‖A‖ · ‖v‖. If A is either a projector or a unitary
operator, then ‖A‖ = 1.
A. Broadbent and S. Lord 4:7
We use the term “quantum state” to refer to both unit vectors |ψ〉 ∈ H and to density
operators ρ ∈ D(H) on some Hilbert space.
Let H ∈ U(Q) be the Hadamard operator defined by |0〉 7→ |0〉+|1〉√2 and |1〉 7→
|0〉−|1〉√
2 . For
any strings x, θ ∈ {0, 1}n, we define the state ∣∣xθ〉 = Hθ1 |x1〉 ⊗Hθ2 |x2〉 ⊗ . . . ⊗Hθn |xn〉.
Note that the set
{∣∣sθ〉}
s∈{0,1}n forms an orthonormal basis of Q(n). Following their
use in [25], we call states of the form
∣∣xθ〉 Wiesner states and we call {∣∣sθ〉}
s∈{0,1}n a
Wiesner basis. For any n ∈ N+, the Einstein-Podolski-Rosen (EPR) [12] state is given by
|EPRn〉 = 1√2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n |x〉 ⊗ |x〉 .
A positive operator-valued measurement (POVM) on a Hilbert spaceH is a finite collection
of positive semidefinite operators {Ei}i∈I on H which sum to the identity. A projective
measurement is a POVM composed of projectors.
We also recall that physically permissible transformation of a quantum system precisely
coincide with the set of completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) maps. In particular,
CPTP map will map density operators to density operators.
A polynomial-time uniform family of circuits C = {Cλ}λ∈N+ is a collection of quantum
circuits indexed by N+ such that there exists a polynomial-time deterministic Turing machine
T which, on input 1λ, produces a description of Cλ. We refer to such families as efficient circuits.
Each circuit Cλ defines and implements a certain CPTP map Cλ : D(HIn,λ) → D(HOut,λ)
where the Hilbert spaces HIn,λ and HOut,λ are implicitly defined by the circuit. Note that we
consider general, i.e.: possibly non-unitary, circuits. These were introduced in [3]. It is worth
noting that a universal gate set for general quantum circuits exists which is composed of only
unitary gates, implementing maps of the form ρ 7→ UρU† for some unitary operator U , and
two non-unitary maps which are the single qubit partial trace map Tr : D(Q)→ D(C) and
the state preparation map Aux : D(C)→ D(Q) defined by 1 7→ |0〉〈0|. Further information
on this circuit model can be found in [23].
2.2 Monogamy-of-Entanglement Games
Monogamy-of-entanglement games were introduced and studied in [20]. In short, such a game
is played by Alice against cooperating Bob and Charlie. Alice describes to Bob and Charlie a
collection of different POVMs which she could use to measure a quantum state on a Hilbert
space HA. These POVMs are indexed by a finite set Θ and each reports a measurement
result taken from a finite set X. Bob and Charlie then produce a tripartite quantum state
ρ ∈ D(HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HC), giving the A register to Alice, the B register to Bob and the C
register to Charlie. Alice then picks a θ ∈ Θ, measures her subsystem with the corresponding
POVM and obtains some result x ∈ X. She then announces θ to Bob and Charlie who are
now isolated. Bob and Charlie win if and only if they can both simultaneously guess the
result x.
Upper bounds on the winning probability of Bob and Charlie in such games was the
primary subject of study in [20]. One of their main results, corresponding to a game where
Alice measures in a random Wiesner basis, is as follows.
I Theorem 1 ([20]). Let λ ∈ N+. For any Hilbert spaces HB and HC , any collections of
POVMs{{
Bθx
}
x∈{0,1}λ
}
θ∈{0,1}n
and
{{
Cθx
}
x∈{0,1}λ
}
θ∈{0,1}n
(1)
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on these Hilbert spaces, and any state ρ ∈ D(Q(λ)⊗HB ⊗HC), we have that
E
θ
∑
x∈{0,1}λ
Tr
[(∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣⊗Bθx ⊗ Cθx) ρ] ≤ (12 + 12√2
)λ
. (2)
Using standard techniques, we recast this theorem in a context where Alice sends to Bob
and Charlie a random Wiesner state and they split this state among themselves via a CPTP
map Φ.
I Corollary 2. Let λ ∈ N+. For any Hilbert spaces HB and HC , any collections of POVMs{{
Bθx
}
x∈{0,1}λ
}
θ∈{0,1}λ
and
{{
Cθx
}
x∈{0,1}λ
}
θ∈{0,1}λ
(3)
on these Hilbert spaces, and any CPTP map Φ : D(Q(λ))→ D(HB ⊗HC), we have that
E
θ
E
x
Tr
[(
Bθx ⊗ Cθx
)
Φ
(∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣)] ≤ (12 + 12√2
)λ
. (4)
The proof can be found in the full version, but conceptually follows from a two-step
argument. First, we only consider states of the form (1⊗ Φ) |EPRλ〉〈EPRλ| for some CPTP
map Φ and where Alice keeps the intact subsytems from the EPR pairs. Then, we apply the
correspondence between Alice measuring her half of an EPR pair in a random Wiesner basis
and her sending a random Wiesner state. This correspondence is similar to the one used in
the Shor-Preskill proof of security for the BB84 QKD protocol [19].
Corollary 2 can be seen as the source of “uncloneability” for our upcoming protocols.
When Alice sends a state
∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣, picked uniformly at random, to Bob and Charlie, she
has a guarantee that it is unlikely for both of them to learn x even if she later divulges θ.
It is worth noting that Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 have no computational or hardness
assumptions.
2.3 Oracles and Quantum-Secure Pseudorandom Functions
A quantum-secure pseudorandom function is a keyed function which appears random to an
efficient quantum adversary who only sees its input/output behaviour and is ignorant of the
particular key being used. We formally define this notion with the help of oracles. Quantum
accessible oracles have been previously studied in the literature, for example in [8, 22].
For a function H ∈ Bool(n,m), a circuit C is said to have oracle access to H, denoted CH ,
if we add to its gate set a gate implementing the unitary operator OH ∈ U(Q(n)Q ⊗Q(m)R)
defined on computational basis states by
|x〉Q ⊗ |y〉R 7→ |x〉Q ⊗ |y ⊕H(x)〉R . (5)
Colloquially, we are giving C a “black box” which computes the function H. Note that for
any two functions H,H ′ ∈ Bool(n,m), we can obtain the circuit CH′ from CH by replacing
every instance of the OH gate by the OH′ gate.
Our definition of a quantum-secure pseudorandom function, inspired by [27], is as follows.
I Definition 3 (Quantum-Secure Pseudorandom Function). A quantum-secure pseudorandom
function F is a collection of functions
F =
{
fλ : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}`In(λ) → {0, 1}`Out(λ)
}
λ∈N+
(6)
where `In, `Out : N+ → N+ and such that:
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1. There is an efficient quantum circuit F = {Fλ}λ∈N+ such that Fλ implements the CPTP
map Fλ given by ρ 7→ UλρU†λ where Uλ ∈ U(Q(λ+ `In(λ) + `Out(λ))) is defined by
Uλ
( |k〉 ⊗ |a〉 ⊗ |b〉 ) = |k〉 ⊗ |a〉 ⊗ |b⊕ fλ(k, a)〉 . (7)
2. For all efficient quantum circuits D = {DHλ }λ∈N+ having oracle access to a function
of the form H ∈ Bool(`In(λ), `Out(λ)), each implementing a CPTP map of the form
DHλ : D(C)→ D(Q), there is a negligible function η such that:∣∣∣∣Ek Tr [ |0〉〈0|Dfλ(k,·)λ (1)]− EH Tr [ |0〉〈0|DHλ (1)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ η(λ) . (8)
We should think of D as a circuit which attempts to distinguish two different cases: was
it given oracle access to the pseudorandom function f(k, ·) : {0, 1}`In(λ) → {0, 1}`Out(λ) for a
randomly sampled k ∈ {0, 1}λ? Or to a function H ∈ Bool(`In(λ), `Out(λ)) sampled truly at
random? The circuit takes no input and produces a single bit of output, via measuring a
single qubit in the computational basis. The bound given in the definition ensures that the
probability distribution of the output does not change by much in both scenarios.
In his work on quantum-secure pseudorandom functions [27], Zhandry showed that certain
common constructions of pseudorandom functions are secure against quantum adversaries.
3 Uncloneable Encryption
The encryption of classical plaintexts into classical ciphertexts has been extensively studied.
The study of encrypting quantum plaintexts into quantum ciphertexts has also received
some attention, for example in [4]. Uncloneable encryption is a security notion for classical
plaintexts which is impossible to achieve in any meaningful way with classical ciphertexts.
Thus, we formally define a notion of quantum encryptions for classical messages in Section 3.1
and then give our security definitions in Section 3.2.
3.1 Quantum Encryptions of Classical Messages
A quantum encryption of classical messages scheme is a procedure which takes as input a
plaintext and a key, in the form of classical bit strings, and produces a ciphertext in the form
of a quantum state. We model these schemes as efficient quantum circuits and CPTP maps
where classical bit strings are identified with computational basis states: s ↔ |s〉〈s|. Our
schemes are parametrized by a security parameter λ. In general, the message size n = n(λ),
the key size κ = κ(λ), and the size of the ciphertext ` = `(λ) may depend on λ. This is
formalized in Definition 4.
I Definition 4 (Quantum Encryption of Classical Messages). A quantum encryption of classical
messages (QECM) scheme is a triplet of efficient quantum circuits S = (Key, Enc, Dec)
implementing CPTP maps of the form
Keyλ : D(C)→ D(HK,λ),
Encλ : D(HK,λ ⊗HM,λ)→ D(HT,λ), and
Decλ : D(HK,λ ⊗HT,λ)→ D(HM,λ)
where, for functions n, `, κ : N+ → N+, the plaintext space is given by HM,λ = Q(n(λ)), the
ciphertext space is given by HT,λ = Q(`(λ)), and the keyspace is given by HK,λ = Q(κ(λ)).
For all λ ∈ N+, k ∈ {0, 1}κ(λ), and m ∈ {0, 1}n(λ), the maps must satisfy
Tr[|k〉〈k|Key(1)] > 0 =⇒ Tr[|m〉〈m|Deck ◦ Enck(|m〉〈m|)] = 1 (9)
where λ is implicit, Enck is the CPTP map defined by ρ 7→ Enc(|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρ), and we define
Deck analogously.
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A short discussion on the key generation circuit, Key, is in order. First, note that Key
takes no input. Indeed, the domain of Keyλ is D(C) and C is the state space of zero qubits.
In particular, there is a single valid quantum state on C: D(C) = {1}. To generate a classical
key to be used by the encryption and decryption circuits Encλ and Decλ, a party runs the
circuit Keyλ and obtains the quantum state Keyλ(1). This quantum state is then measured
in the computational basis and the result of this measurement is used as the key. We then
see that Equation (9) is a correctness condition which imposes that, for all keys that may be
generated, a valid ciphertext is always correctly decrypted.
3.2 Security Notions
Now that we have formal definition for QECM schemes, we can define security notions for
these schemes. We define three such notions:
1. Indistinguishable security. Conceptually inspired by the original security notion of indis-
tinguishable encryptions [14], which considers classical plaintexts and classical ciphertexts,
and similar in details to an analogue definition in [4] which considers quantum plaintexts
and quantum ciphertexts, this security notion considers classical plaintexts and quantum
ciphertexts. It is formally stated in Definition 6.
2. Uncloneable security. This security notion is novel to this work and captures, in the
broadest sense, what we mean by an “uncloneable encryption scheme”. This security
notion is defined in Definition 8 and is paramatrized by a real value 0 ≤ t ≤ n, where n
is the message size. The case where t = 0 is ideal and t = n is trivial. In particular, no
encryption scheme with classical ciphertexts may achieve t-uncloneable security for t < n.
3. Uncloneable-indistinguishable security. This security notion is also novel to this work. It
can be seen as a combination of indistinguishable and uncloneable security. It is formally
defined in Definition 11.
Each of these security notions is defined in two steps. First, we define a type of attack
(Definitions 5, 7 and 10). Then, we say that the QECM scheme achieves the given security
notion if all admissible attacks have their winning probability appropriately bounded (Defini-
tions 6, 8 and 11). The definitions for uncloneable security and uncloneable-indistinguishable
security will formalize the games which we described in Section 1.1.
Note that many classical encryption schemes which are secure against quantum adversaries,
such as the one-time pad, are indistinguishable secure but satisfy neither uncloneable security
notions as their ciphertexts can alway be perfectly copied. We also discuss in Appendix A
a scheme which offers non-trivial uncloneable security but is not in any way uncloneable-
indistinguishable secure.
We first define our notion of indistinguishable security.
I Definition 5 (Distinguishing Attack). Let S be a QECM scheme. A distinguishing attack
against S is a pair of efficient quantum circuits A = (G, A) implementing CPTP maps of the
form
Gλ : D(C)→ D(HS,λ ⊗HM,λ) and
Aλ : D(HS,λ ⊗HT,λ)→ D(Q)
where HS,λ = Q(s(λ)) for a function s : N+ → N+ and HM,λ and HT,λ are as defined by S.
I Definition 6 (Indistinguishable Security). Let S be a QECM scheme. For a fixed and
implicit value of λ, we define the CPTP map Enc1k : D(HM,λ)→ D(HT,λ) by
ρ 7→
∑
m∈{0,1}n
Tr [|m〉〈m| ρ] · Enck(|m〉〈m|) (10)
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and the CPTP map Enc0k : D(HM,λ)→ D(HT,λ) by
ρ 7→ Enck(|0n〉〈0n|) (11)
where 0n ∈ {0, 1}n is the all zero bit string.
Then, we say that S is indistinguishable secure if for all distinguishing attacks A against S,
there exists a negligible function η such that
E
b
E
k←K
Tr
[|b〉〈b|Aλ ◦ (1S ⊗ Encbk) ◦G(1)] ≤ 12 + η(λ) (12)
where λ is implicit on the left-hand side, b ∈ {0, 1}, and Kλ is the random variable distributed
on the set {0, 1}κ(λ) such that Pr [Kλ = k] = Tr [|k〉〈k|Keyλ(1)].
In Definition 6, the map Enc0k should be seen as discarding whatever plaintext was given
and producing the encryption of the all zero bit string. On the other hand, Enc1k is the map
which first measures the state given in the computational basis, to ensure that the plaintext
is indeed a classical message, and then encrypts this message. We say that a QECM scheme
has indistinguishable security if no efficient adversary can distinguish between both of these
scenarios (by trying to determine the value of b) with more then a negligible advantage. This
security notion allows us to show that the schemes we define do offer a level of security as
encryption schemes.
Next, we formalize the intuitive definition for uncloneable security as given by the game
described in Section 1.1. In Figure 2, we sketch out the relation between the various CPTP
maps and the underlying Hilbert spaces considered in this definition.
I Definition 7 (Cloning Attack). Let S be a QECM scheme. A cloning attack against S is a
triplet of efficient quantum circuits A = (A, B, C) implementing CPTP maps of the form
Aλ : D(HT,λ)→ D(HB,λ ⊗HC,λ),
Bλ : D(HK,λ ⊗HB,λ)→ D(HM,λ), and
Cλ : D(HK,λ ⊗HC,λ)→ D(HM,λ)
where HB,λ = Q(β(λ)) and HC,λ = Q(γ(λ)) for some functions β, γ : N+ → N+ and HK,λ,
HM,λ, and HT,λ are as defined by S.
I Definition 8 (Uncloneable Security). A QECM scheme S is t(λ)-uncloneable secure if for
all cloning attacks A against S there exists a negligible function η such that
E
m
E
k←K
Tr [(|m〉〈m| ⊗ |m〉〈m|) (Bk ⊗ Ck) ◦A ◦ Enck (|m〉〈m|)] ≤ 2−n+t(λ) + η(λ) (13)
where λ is implicit on the left-hand side, Kλ is a random variable distributed on {0, 1}κ(λ) such
that Pr [Kλ = k] = Tr [|k〉〈k|Keyλ(1)] and Bk is the CPTP map defined by ρ 7→ B(|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρ)
and similarly for Ck.
If S is 0-uncloneable secure, we simply say that it is uncloneable secure.
The left-hand side of Equation (13) is the probability, averaged over all messages and all
keys, that both adversaries can correctly output the encrypted message.
We note that any encryption which produces classical ciphertexts cannot be t-uncloneable
secure for any t < n. Indeed, an attack A where A copies the classical ciphertext and where
B = C = Dec succeeds with probability 1.
Our definition of uncloneable security is with respect to messages sampled uniformly
at random. However, if the length of the message is fixed, t-uncloneable security implies a
similar security notion for messages sampled according to other distributions. We formalize
this in the next theorem whose proof can be found in Appendix B.1.
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Figure 2 Schematic representation of the maps considered in a cloning attack (Definition 7). The
k subscript indicates which maps have access to the encryption key.
I Theorem 9. Let S be a QECM scheme which is t-uncloneable secure and whose message
size is constant, i.e.: n(λ) = n. Let M be a random variable distributed over {0, 1}n with
min-entropy h. Then, for any cloning attack A on S there is a negligible function η such
that
E
m←M
E
k←K
Tr [(|m〉〈m| ⊗ |m〉〈m|) (Bk ⊗ Ck) ◦A ◦ Enck |m〉〈m|] ≤ 2−h+t(λ) + η(λ) (14)
where λ is implicit on the left-hand side.
Finally, we formalize the notion of uncloneable-indistinguishable security (see Section 1.1
for a description in terms of a game, and Figure 3 for the relation between the various CPTP
maps and the underlying Hilbert spaces).
I Definition 10 (Cloning-Distinguishing Attack). Let S be a QECM scheme. A cloning-
distinguishing attack against S is a tuple A = (G, A, B, C) of efficient quantum circuits
implementing CPTP maps of the form
Gλ : D(C)→ D(HS,λ ⊗HM,λ),
Aλ : D(HS,λ ⊗HT,λ)→ D(HB,λ ⊗HC,λ),
Bλ : D(HK,λ ⊗HB,λ)→ D(Q), and
Cλ : D(HK,λ ⊗HC,λ)→ D(Q)
where HS,λ = Q(s(λ)), HB,λ = Q(β(λ)), and HC,λ = Q(γ(λ)) for s, β, γ : N+ → N+ and all
other Hilbert spaces are as defined by S.
I Definition 11 (Uncloneable-Indistinguishable Security). Let S be a QECM scheme and define
Enc0k and Enc1k as in Definition 6.
We say that S is uncloneable-indistinguishable secure if for all cloning-distinguishing
attacks A there exists a negligible function η such that
E
b
E
k←K
Tr
[
(|b〉〈b| ⊗ |b〉〈b|) (Bk ⊗ Ck) ◦A ◦
(
1S ⊗ Encbk
) ◦G(1)] ≤ 12 + η(λ) (15)
where λ is implicit on the left-hand side, Kλ is the random variable distributed on {0, 1}κ(λ)
such that Pr[K = k] = Tr[|k〉〈k|K(1)], Bk is the CPTP map defined by ρ 7→ B(|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρ),
and similarly for Ck.
The left-hand side of Equation (15) is the probability, averaged all keys, that both
adversaries can correctly determine if their submitted message (generated by G) or the all 0
bit string was encrypted.
It is trivial to see, but worth noting, that uncloneable-indistinguishable security implies
indistinguishable security. Indeed, if a scheme is not indistinguishable secure, then an ad-
versary can determine which message was encrypted (with non-negligible advantage) without
having to wait for the key to be divulged. Thus, instead of trying to split the ciphertext,
the A circuit in an uncloneable-indistinguishable attack should attempt to determine which
message was encrypted and simply pass on the result to the B and C circuits.
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Figure 3 Schematic representation of the maps considered in a cloning-distinguishing attack
(Definition 10). The k subscript indicates which maps have access to the encryption key.
Finally, it can also be shown that any 0-uncloneable secure QECM scheme S with constant
message length is uncloneable-indistinguishable secure. The proof can be found in the full
version and proceeds by using any cloning-distinguishing attack to construct a cloning attack.
We then show that security against the constructed cloning attack implies security against
the original distinguishing-cloning attack.
I Theorem 12. Let S be an 0-uncloneable secure QECM with constant message size, i.e.:
n(λ) is the constant function n(λ) = n, then S is also uncloneable-indistinguishable secure.
4 An Uncloneable Encryption Scheme
A first scheme which attempts to achieve a notion of uncloneable encryption is presented in
Appendix A. It is based on a simple use of Wiesner states and illustrates the basic principle,
but it is in many respects insufficient.
In Section 4.1, we present a refinement of the Appendix A protocol which uses quantum
secure pseudorandom functions. The proof of the uncloneable security of this protocol relies
on technical lemmas presented in Section 4.2. We give our final main results in Section 4.3.
4.1 Our qPRF Scheme
As discussed in Section 1.1, the motivation for this scheme is to use quantum-secure pseudo-
random functions to attempt to “distill” the uncloneability found in the Wiesner state.
I Definition 13 (F -Conjugate Encryption). Let F = {fλ :{0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}n(λ)}λ∈N+
be a quantum-secure pseudorandom function for a function n : N+ → N+. We define the
F-conjugate encryption QECM scheme by the circuits implementing the following algorithms
which are implicitly parametrized by λ. Note that the message size is the output size of the
qPRF, n(λ), the key size is κ(λ) = 2λ, and the ciphertext size is `(λ) = λ+ n(λ).
Algorithm 1 Key generation circuit, Key.
Input :None.
Output :A state ρ ∈ D(Q(κ(λ))).
1 Sample s← {0, 1}λ uniformly at random.
2 Sample θ ← {0, 1}λ uniformly at random.
3 Output ρ = |s〉〈s| ⊗ |θ〉〈θ|.
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Algorithm 2 Encryption circuit, Enc.
Input :A plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}n and a key (s, θ) ∈ {0, 1}κ.
Output :A ciphertext ρ ∈ D(Q(`(λ))).
1 Sample x← {0, 1}λ uniformly at random.
2 Compute c = m⊕ fλ(s, x).
3 Output ρ = |c〉〈c| ⊗ ∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣.
Algorithm 3 Decryption circuit, Dec.
Input :A ciphertext |c〉〈c| ⊗ ρ ∈ D(Q(`)) and a key (s, θ) ∈ {0, 1}κ.
Output :A plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}n.
1 Compute ρ′ = HθρHθ.
2 Measure ρ′ in the computational basis. Call the result r.
3 Output m = c⊕ fλ(s, r).
It is trivial to see that this scheme is correct. It is also straightforward to see that
this scheme is indistinguishable secure (Definition 6). Indeed, if we replace the qPRF with
a function chosen uniformly a random from Bool(λ, n(λ)), then the ciphertext, averaged
over all keys, is independent of the plaintext. Security then follows from the fact that
efficient adversaries cannot distinguish with non-negligible advantage between the qPRF and
a function chosen randomly from Bool(λ, n(λ)).
4.2 Technical Lemmas
The following two lemmas form the core of the upcoming proofs of uncloneable security and
they can be seen as extending Unruh’s one-way-to-hiding lemma [22] to a two player setting.
They are interpreted as follows.
We consider two adversaries who have oracle access to a function H ∈ Bool(λ, n) which
is chosen uniformly at random. Their goal is to simultaneously guess the value H(x) for
some value of x. The adversaries share a quantum state representing all the information
they initially have on x. The lemmas relate the probability of both parties simultaneously
guessing H(x) to their probability of being able to both simultaneously guess x.
The first of these lemmas, Lemma 14, considers this problem in a setting where the
adversaries do not share any entanglement. The second, Lemma 15, imposes no such
restriction.
We show that the probability that both adversaries correctly guess H(x) is upper bounded
by 12n + Q ·G or 92n + Q′ ·G′ where Q and Q′ are polynomial functions of the number of
queries the adversaries make to the oracle and G and G′ quantify their probability of guessing
x with a particular strategy. The factor of 9 is present only if we allow the adversaries to
share entanglement.
We can interpret G and G′ in a manner very similar to its analogous quantity in Unruh’s
one-way-to-hiding lemma [22]. The adversaries, instead of continuing until the end of their
computation, will stop immediately before a certain (randomly chosen) query to the oracle
and measure their query register in the computational basis. Then, G is related to the
probability that this procedure succeeds at letting both adversaries simultaneously obtain x,
averaged over the possible stopping points and possible functions implemented by the oracle.
The key idea in the proof of these lemmas is that we can decompose the unitary operator
representing each of the adversaries’ computations into two “parts” (see Equation (26)). One
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of these “parts” will never query the oracle on x and the other could query the oracle on x.
This idea was present in the proof of Unruh’s one-way-to-hiding lemma [22].
Recall from Section 2.3 that we model queries to an oracle implementing a function H as
a unitary operator OH acting on a query and a response register with Hilbert spaces HQ
and HR respectively. The action of this unitary operator on the computational basis states
is given by |x〉Q ⊗ |y〉R 7→ |x〉Q ⊗ |y ⊕H(x)〉R. A party having access to an oracle may also
have some other register with Hilbert space HS with which they perform other computations.
In general, their computation can then be modeled by an operator of the form
(
UOH
)q
where U is a unitary operator on HQ ⊗HR ⊗HS and q is the number of queries made to
the oracle [8, 22].
The proof of Lemma 15 can be found in Appendix B.2. The proof of Lemma 14, which
uses very similar ideas to those found in the proof of Lemma 15, can be found in the full
version.
I Lemma 14. Let λ, n ∈ N+. For L ∈ {B,C}, we let sL, qL ∈ N+, HLQ = Q(λ),
HLR = Q(n), HLS = Q(sL), UL ∈ U(HLQ ⊗ HLR ⊗ HLS ), and {piyL}y∈{0,1}n be a pro-
jective measurement on HLQ ⊗HLR ⊗HLS .
Finally, let |ψ〉 = |ψB〉 ⊗ |ψC〉 be a separable unit vector with |ψL〉 ∈ Q(n+ λ+ sL) for
L ∈ {B,C} and x ∈ {0, 1}λ. Then, we have
E
H
∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((UBOHB )qB ⊗ (UCOHC )qC) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 ≤ 12n + (3q + 2)q 4√M (16)
where ΠH(x) = piH(x)B ⊗ piH(x)C , q = qB + qC and
M = E
k
E` E
H
E
H′
∥∥∥∥(|x〉〈x|BQ ⊗ |x〉〈x|CQ)((UBOHB )k ⊗ (UCOH′C )`) |ψ〉∥∥∥∥2 (17)
with k ∈ {0, . . . , qB − 1}, ` ∈ {0, . . . , qC − 1}, and H,H ′ ∈ Bool(λ, n).
I Lemma 15. Let λ, n ∈ N+. For L ∈ {B,C}, we let sL, qL ∈ N+, HLQ = Q(λ),
HLR = Q(n), HLS = Q(sL), UL ∈ U(HLQ ⊗ HLR ⊗ HLS ), and {piyL}y∈{0,1}n be a pro-
jective measurement on HLQ ⊗HLR ⊗HLS .
Finally, let |ψ〉 ∈ Q(2(λ+n) + sB + sC) be a unit vector and x ∈ {0, 1}λ. Then, we have
E
H
∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((UBOHB )qB ⊗ (UCOHC )qC) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 ≤ 92n + (3qBqC + 2)qBqC√M (18)
where ΠH(x) = piH(x)B ⊗ piH(x)C and
M = E
k
E` E
H
∥∥∥(|x〉〈x|BQ ⊗ |x〉〈x|CQ)((UBOHB )k ⊗ (UCOHC )`) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 (19)
with k ∈ {0, . . . , qB − 1}, ` ∈ {0, . . . , qC − 1}, and H ∈ Bool(λ, n).
4.3 Main Results
We now have all the necessary tools to state our main results.
I Theorem 16. Let S be the QECM scheme defined in Definition 13. If the qPRF is modeled
by a quantum oracle, then S is log2(9)-uncloneable secure.
Our main results (Theorem 16) holds under the following assumptions:
1. The family of functions used in the encryption is indistinguishable from truly random
functions for efficient adversaries (i.e.: it satisfies the indistinguishable property of a
pseudorandom function).
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2. The adversarial circuit A (the one which attempts to split the ciphertext) does not know
precisely which function was used. This models the idea that the A circuit does not know
the encryption key.
3. The adversarial circuits B and C (the ones attempting to guess the plaintext) may only
interact with the function as a “black box”.
One way to model these assumptions is to use the quantum random oracle model, where in
addition we specify that the A circuit cannot query the oracle. This captures the idea that
all circuits, except the A circuit, are given the encryption key.
The above explains our design choice of presenting the scheme with a qPRF, which is
modelled as an oracle in the proof. This allows us to assume that the B and C circuits only use
the key k to query f(k, ·) as a black box. By definition of a qPRF, and since all adversaries
are efficient, this scenario is indistinguishable from the random oracle scenario discussed
above.
The proof of Theorem 16 can be found in Appendix B.2. It essentially argues that
Lemma 15 can be applied with a bound of M ≤
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)λ
, which is negligible in λ, due
to Corollary 2.
We can strengthen this result if the adversaries do not share any entanglement (see
Section 1.2 for an application).
I Theorem 17. Let S be the QECM scheme given in Definition 13. If the qPRF is modeled by
a quantum oracle and the adversaries cannot share any entanglement, then S is 0-uncloneable
secure.
Proof (Sketch). Follow the proof of Theorem 16 using Lemma 14 instead of Lemma 15. J
I Corollary 18. Let S be the QECM scheme given in Definition 13 with constant message
size, i.e.: n(λ) = n. If the qPRF is modeled by a quantum oracle and the adversaries cannot
share any entanglement, then S is indistinguishable-uncloneable secure.
Proof (Sketch). Use Theorem 17 with Theorem 12. J
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A Conjugate Encryption
Our first QECM scheme is a one-time pad encoded into Wiesner states. We emphasize that
this scheme will not offer much in terms of uncloneable security but it remains an instructive
example.
I Definition 19 (Conjugate Encryption). We define the conjugate encryption QECM scheme
by the circuits implementing the following algorithms, each implicitly parametrized by λ.
Note that the message size is n(λ) = λ, the key size is κ(λ) = 2λ and the ciphertext size is
`(λ) = λ.
Algorithm 4 The key generation circuit Key.
Input :None.
Output :A state ρ ∈ D(Q(κ)).
1 Sample r ← {0, 1}n uniformly at random.
2 Sample θ ← {0, 1}n uniformly at random.
3 Output ρ = |r〉〈r| ⊗ |θ〉〈θ|.
Algorithm 5 The encryption circuit Enc.
Input :A plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}n and a key (r, θ) ∈ {0, 1}κ.
Output :A ciphertext ρ ∈ D(Q(n)).
1 Output ρ =
∣∣(m⊕ r)θ〉〈(m⊕ r)θ∣∣.
Algorithm 6 The decryption circuit Dec.
Input :A ciphertext ρ ∈ D(Q(n)) and a key (r, θ) ∈ {0, 1}κ.
Output :A plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}n.
1 Compute ρ′ = HθρHθ.
2 Measure ρ′ in the computational basis. Call the result c. Output c⊕ r.
The correctness of this scheme is trivial to verify and it is indistinguishable secure. The
indistinguishable security follows from the fact that if Enc0r,θ and Enc1r,θ are as defined in
Definition 6, then for any state ρ ∈ D(HS ⊗Q(n)) we have that
E
r
E
θ
(
1S ⊗ Enc1(r,θ)
)
(ρ) = E
r
E
θ
(
1S ⊗ Enc0(r,θ)
)
(ρ). (20)
We will need one small technical lemma before proceeding to the proof of uncloneable
security for this scheme.
I Lemma 20. Let n ∈ N+, f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → R be a function and s ∈ {0, 1}n be a
string. Then, Ex f(x, x⊕ s) = Ex f(x⊕ s, x).
The proof of Lemma 20 may be found in the full version.
I Theorem 21. The scheme in Definition 19 is λ log2
(
1 + 1√2
)
-uncloneable secure.
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Proof. It suffices to show that for any cloning attack A the quantity
E
m
E
r
E
θ
Tr
[
(|m〉〈m| ⊗ |m〉〈m|) (B(r,θ) ⊗ C(r,θ)) ◦A (∣∣(m⊕ r)θ〉〈(m⊕ r)θ∣∣)] (21)
is upper bounded by
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)λ
. By applying Lemma 20 with respect to the expectation
over m, this quantity is the same as
E
m
E
r
E
θ
Tr
[
(|m⊕ r〉〈m⊕ r| ⊗ |m⊕ r〉〈m⊕ r|) (B(r,θ) ⊗ C(r,θ)) ◦A (∣∣mθ〉〈mθ∣∣)] . (22)
We then see that for any fixed r, we can apply Corollary 2 to bound the expectation of the
trace over m and θ by
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)λ
. Setting this quantity to be equal to 2−n+t, recalling
that n = λ, and solving for t completes the proof. J
Finally, note that this scheme cannot be uncloneable-indistinguishable secure if n ≥ 2.
Indeed, the adversaries could submit the all 1 plaintext to be encrypted and split the
ciphertext such that each adversary gets half of the qubits. Once the key is revealed, the
adversaries can then each obtain half of the message with probability 1. This is sufficient to
distinguish between the two possible messages.
B Proofs
B.1 From Section 3
Proof of Theorem 9. For all k ∈ {0, 1}κ(λ) and m ∈ {0, 1}n, define
p(k,m) = Tr [(|m〉〈m| ⊗ |m〉〈m|) (Bk ⊗ Ck) ◦A ◦ Enck (|m〉〈m|)] . (23)
Recalling the min-entropy ofM and that S is t-uncloneable, we may write
E
m←M
E
k←K
Tr [(|m〉〈m| ⊗ |m〉〈m|) (Bk ⊗ Ck) ◦A ◦ Enck (|m〉〈m|)] (24)
=
∑
m∈{0,1}n
Pr [M = m] E
k←K
p(k,m) ≤ 2−h · 2n E
m
E
k←K
p(k,m) ≤ 2−h (2t + 2nη(λ)) .
Noting that λ 7→ 2−h+nη(λ) is a negligible function concludes the proof. J
B.2 From Section 4
Before giving the proofs of Lemmas 14 and 15, we need the following three small lemmas.
The first two, Lemma 22 and Lemma 23, have straightforward proofs which may be found in
the full version. The third, Lemma 24, implicitly appears in [22].
I Lemma 22. Let R be a ring with a, b ∈ R and c = a+ b. Then, for all n ∈ N+, we have
that cn = an +
∑n−1
k=0 a
n−k−1bck.
I Lemma 23. Let H be a Hilbert space, n ∈ N+, and {v0, v1, . . . , vn} be n + 1 vectors
in H such that ‖vi‖ ≤ 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ‖
∑n
i=0 vi‖ ≤ 1. Then, we have that
‖∑ni=0 vi‖2 ≤ ‖v0‖2 + (3n+ 2)∑ni=1 ‖vi‖.
I Lemma 24. Let f : Bool(n,m) → R be a function and x ∈ {0, 1}n be a string. For any
H ∈ Bool(n,m) and y ∈ {0, 1}m, define Hx,y ∈ Bool(n,m) by
s 7→
{
H(s) if s 6= x,
y if s = x.
(25)
Then, EH f(H) = EH Ey f(Hx,y).
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We can now give the proofs of our main technical lemma from Section 4.2.
Proof of Lemma 15. For L ∈ {B,C}, we define PL = |x〉〈x|LQ . Using Lemma 22 and the
fact that we may write ULOHL = ULOHL PL + ULOHL (1− PL), we have that
(
ULO
H
L
)qL =
=V HL︷ ︸︸ ︷(
ULO
H
L (1− PL)
)qL + qL−1∑
k=0
=WH,k
L︷ ︸︸ ︷(
ULO
H (1− PL)
)qL−k−1
ULO
H
L PL
(
ULO
H
L
)k (26)
and we define WHL =
∑qL−1
k=0 W
H,k
L . This implies that∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((UBOHB )qB ⊗ (UCOHC )qC) |ψ〉∥∥∥2
=
∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((OBOHB )qB ⊗ V HC + V HB ⊗WHC +WHB ⊗WHC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2. (27)
We now claim that the contribution from the WHB ⊗WHC operator corresponds to the M
in the upper bound provided in the statement. Indeed, using Lemma 23, the definition of
the various W operators, and properties of the operator norm on projectors and unitary
operators, we have that∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((OBOHB )qB ⊗ V HC + V HB ⊗WHC +WHB ⊗WHC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2
≤
∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((OBOHB )qB ⊗ V HC + V HB ⊗WHC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2
+ (3qBqC + 2)qBqC E
k
E`
∥∥∥(PB ⊗ PC)((UBOHB )k ⊗ (UCOHC )`) |ψ〉∥∥∥.
(28)
Using Jensen’s inequality, the above inequality and the definition of M , we have that
E
H
∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((OBOHB )qB ⊗ V HC + V HB ⊗WHC +WHB ⊗WHC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2
≤ E
H
∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((OBOHB )qB ⊗ V HC + V HB ⊗WHC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 + (3qBqC + 2)qBqC√M. (29)
It now suffices to show that
E
H
∥∥∥ΠH(x) ((OBOHB )qB ⊗ V HC + V HB ⊗WHC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 ≤ 92n . (30)
By Lemma 24, this is equivalent to showing that
E
H
E
y
∥∥∥Πy ((UBOHx,yB )qB ⊗ V Hx,yC + V Hx,yB ⊗WHx,yC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 ≤ 92n . (31)
In fact, it will be sufficient to show that for any particular H, the expectation over y is
bounded by 9 · 2−n. If, for any H, we define
α = E
y
∥∥∥Πy ((UBOHx,yB )qB ⊗ V Hx,yC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 and β = Ey ∥∥∥Πy (V Hx,yB ⊗WHx,yC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 (32)
then, using the triangle inequality and the fact that the operators in {Πy}y∈{0,1}n project on
mutually orthogonal subspaces, we have that
E
y
∥∥∥Πy ((OBOHx,yB )qB ⊗ V Hx,yC + V Hx,yB ⊗WHx,yC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2 ≤ α+ β + 2√αβ. (33)
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Now, noting that V Hx,yB and V
Hx,y
C do not depend on the value of y, as they always project
on a subspace which does not query the oracle H on x, and using properties of the operator
norm, we have that
α = E
y
∥∥∥Πy ((UBOHx,yB )qB ⊗ V Hx,yC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2
≤ E
y
‖piyB ⊗ 1C‖2 ·
∥∥∥(UBOHx,yB )qB ⊗ 1C∥∥∥2 · ∥∥∥(1B ⊗ piyC)(1B ⊗ V Hx,yC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2
≤ E
y
∥∥∥(1B ⊗ piyC)(1B ⊗ V Hx,yC ) |ψ〉∥∥∥2
= 12n
∥∥(1B ⊗ V HC ) |ψ〉∥∥2 ≤ 12n .
(34)
A similar reasoning yields that β ≤ 4 · 2−n, where the 4 is a result of squaring the upper
bound∥∥∥WHx,yC ∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥(UCOHx,yC )qC∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥V Hx,yC ∥∥∥ ≤ 2. (35)
Finally, noting that α+ β + 2
√
αβ ≤ 9 · 2−n finishes the proof. J
Finally, we can give the proof of our main result.
Proof of Theorem 16. Let A = (A, B, C) be a cloning attack against S as described in
Definition 7. We need to show that the probability that the adversaries can simultaneously
guess a message chosen uniformly at random is upper bounded by 9 · 2−n + η(λ) for a
negligible function η. Furthermore, since the adversaries treat the qPRF as an oracle, it
suffices to show that their winning probability is upper bounded by 9 · 2−n + η(λ) when
averaged over all functions in Bool(λ, n) and not only the functions {fλ(s, ·)}s∈{0,1}λ . Indeed,
by definition of a qPRF, their winning probability in both cases can differ by at most a
negligible function of λ.
The remainder of the proof is an application of Lemma 15 followed by an application of
Corollary 2.
Accounting for the randomness of the encryption and for a fixed and implicit λ, the
quantity we wish to bound is given by
ω = E
H
E
θ
E
x
E
m
Tr
[
Pm
(
BHθ ⊗ CHθ
) ◦A (|m⊕H(x)〉〈m⊕H(x)| ⊗ ∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣)] (36)
where Pm = |m〉〈m| ⊗ |m〉〈m| and H ∈ Bool(λ, n). Then, by using Lemma 20 with respect
to the expectation over m to move the dependence on the string H(x) from the state to the
projector, we have that
ω = E
H
E
θ
E
x
E
m
Tr
[
Pm⊕H(x)
(
BHθ ⊗ CHθ
) ◦A (|m〉〈m| ⊗ ∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣)] . (37)
Using standard purification arguments, we add auxiliary states |aux-B〉〈aux-B| and
|aux-C〉〈aux-C| to the state A(|m〉〈m| ⊗ ∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣), replace the CPTP maps BHθ and CHθ by
unitary operators on the resulting larger Hilbert spaces and replace the projectors |m〉〈m| by
projectors {pimB }m∈{0,1}n and {pimC }m∈{0,1}n on these larger Hilbert spaces.
Following [8], these purified unitary operators will be of the form
(
UθLO
H
L
)qL , acting on a
Hilbert space of the form Q(λ)LQ ⊗Q(n)LR ⊗Q(sL)LS for some qL, sL ∈ N+ as they model
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oracle computations. In particular, we note that qL represents the number of queries made
to the oracle by that particular party. We also assume that
ρm,x,θ = A(|m〉〈m| ⊗ ∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣)⊗ |aux-B〉〈aux-B| ⊗ |aux-C〉〈aux-C|
∈ D(Q(λ)BQ ⊗Q(n)BR ⊗Q(sB)BS ⊗Q(λ)CQ ⊗Q(n)CR ⊗Q(sC)CS ).
(38)
Next, we can write ρm,x,θ as an ensemble of pure states, which is to say that
ρm,x,θ =
∑
i∈Im,x,θ
pi
∣∣∣ψm,x,θi 〉〈ψm,x,θi ∣∣∣ (39)
for some index set Im,x,θ, some non-zero pi which sum to 1, and some unit vectors
∣∣∣ψm,x,θi 〉.
It then follows that ω can be expressed as
E
m
E
θ
E
x
E
H
∑
i∈Im,x,θ
pi
∥∥∥(pim⊕H(x)B ⊗ pim⊕H(x)C )((UθBOHB )qB ⊗ (UθCOHC )qC) ∣∣∣ψm,x,θi 〉∥∥∥2. (40)
Noting that we can bring the expectation with respect to H into the summation, we can
then use Lemma 15 to upper bound ω by
9
2n + q EmEθ Ex
∑
i∈Im,x,θ
pi
√
E
H
E
k
E`
∥∥∥Qx ((UBOHB )qB ⊗ (UCOHC )qC) ∣∣∣ψm,x,θi 〉∥∥∥2 (41)
where q = (3qBqC + 2)qBqC and Qx = |x〉〈x|QB ⊗ |x〉〈x|QC . Defining
βθ,H,kx =
((
UθBO
H
B
)qB)† |x〉〈x|QB ((UθBOHB )qB) , (42)
and similarly for γθ,H,`x by replacing every instance of B with C, we use Jensen’s lemma to
bring the remaining expectations and sums into the square root and obtain
ω = 92n + q
√
E
m
E
θ
E
x
E
H
E
k
E`Tr
[(
βθ,H,kx ⊗ γθ,H,k
)
ρm,x,θ
]
. (43)
Letting Φm to be the CPTP map defined by
ρ 7→ A (|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρ)⊗ |aux-B〉〈aux-B| ⊗ |aux-C〉〈aux-C| (44)
we see that, for any fixed H, k, `, and m, Corollary 2 implies that
E
x
E
θ
Tr
[(
βθ,H,kx ⊗ γθ,H,k
)
ρm,x,θ
] ≤ (12 + 12√2
)λ
(45)
since ρm,x,θ = Φm
(∣∣xθ〉〈xθ∣∣). Thus,
ω ≤ 92n + q
(√
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)λ
. (46)
Finally, since B and C are efficient quantum circuits, they may query the oracle a number of
time which grows at most polynomially in λ. Thus, q ≤ p(λ) for some polynomial p. Noting
that the function λ 7→ p(λ) ·
(√
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)λ
is a negligible function completes the proof. J
